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SECURITIES LAW
BARRY H. BARNE'T*
INTRODUCTION
The New Mexico Courts and the Tenth Circuit confronted several issues
during the survey period.' The New Mexico cases interpreted various
provisions, and their application, of the recently revised New Mexico
Securities Act.2 The Tenth Circuit cases addressed such issues as "fraud
on the market," 3 "recklessness" 4 as satisfying the element of scienter
under Section 10(b)5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19346 and Rule
lOb-5,' horizontal commonality in the investment contract analysis,8 the
constitutionality 9 of the Oklahoma Take-Over Bid Act,'" the "sale of
business" doctrine," control person liability, 2 tolling of the statute of
limitations for fraud, 3 secondary liability as an aider and abettor,'4 and
standing.
*A member of the New Mexico, Florida, and Illinois Bars. Mr. Barnett is designated in Securities
Law under Florida's Designation Program and was formerly a staff attorney with the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission, Chicago. Mr. Barnett is a shareholder in the law firm of
Barnett, Leverick and Musselman, P.C., Albuquerque and Taos, New Mexico.
1. The primary period covered is January 1, 1985 through December 31, 1985. However, since
this is the first survey article covering New Mexico securities law, this article also briefly addresses
significant securities cases decided during the period January 1, 1980 through December 31, 1984,
the secondary period.
2. The 37th Legislature of the State of New Mexico, Second Session, enacted a new securities
law, The New Mexico Securities Act of 1986, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-13B-1 to 58-13B-53 (Repl.
Pamp. 1986), which became effective on July I, 1986. This new securities act may impact on the
continuing validity of some of the opinions rendered in the cases discussed.
3. T. J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330 (10th
Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984).
4. Hackbart v. Homes,675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982).
5. 15 U.S.C.A. §78j(b) (West 1981).
6. 15 U.S.C.A. §§78a-78jj (West 1981) [hereinafter cited as the Exchange Act].
7. 17 CF. R. §240. 1Ob-5 (1986).
8. McGill v. Am. Land & Exploration Co., 776 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1985).
9. Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983).
10. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, §§431-450 (1981) (repealed 1985).
11. Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1983).
12. San Francisco-Oklahoma Petroleum Exploration Corp. v. Carstan Oil Co., 765 F.2d 962 (10th
Cir. 1985) and Cowles v. Dow Keith Oil & Gas, Inc., 752 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
13. Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 454
U.S. 895 (1981).
14. Decker v. S.E.C., 631 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1980).
15. Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Bader & Dufty, 627 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1980).
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
I. NEW MEXICO SECURITIES LAW
The most dramatic event during the survey period was the enactment
of the New Mexico Securities Act of 1986.16 This new law represents a
major effort to modernize securities regulation in New Mexico. In general,
this new law modifies existing definitions," restricts or eliminates certain
exempt securities,"8 modifies certain transactional exemptions, 9 adds a
significant new transactional exemption,2" and enhances the enforcement
abilities of the Securities Division.2
The new securities act also modifies the focus of the regulation of the
offer and sale of securities. The regulation of the offer and sale of securities
can generally be classified into two categories: disclosure oriented reg-
ulation which is the federal approach; and merit review oriented regulation
which is the approach of many states, New Mexico included.22 With the
enactment of the New Mexico Securities Act of 1986, New Mexico has
moved from a pure merit review state to a modified merit review state.23
16. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§58-13B-! to 58-13B-53 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
17. See, e.g., the new definition of "broker-dealer," N.M. STAT. ANN. §58-13B-2.B (Repl.
Pamp. 1986) and compare it with the old definition, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-2.B (Supp. 1985).
18. The starting point under all securities laws is that the offer and sale of any security is unlawful
unless that security is first registered. There are two exemptions from this requirement, exempt
securities and securities that are sold in a transaction, that is exempt from registration. An exempt
security is one that is not subject to the registration requirements of the law. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-
13B-26 (Repl. Pamp. 1986). Exempt securities are of a type that normally do not require the
protections afforded by registration (i.e., disclosure) because of the real or theoretical quality of the
security. One example is a security guaranteed by the United States of America. The most notable
definitional restriction of exempt securities under the new law pertains to industrial development
and industrial revenue bonds. See, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-26.A (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
19. A transactional exemption involves a security that would otherwise be required to be registered
prior to sale, but is exempt from registration because the manner by which it is sold meets one of
the specified exemptions from registration. The former small offering transactional exemptions for
New Mexico corporations and partnerships, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-30.J and § 58-13-30.0 (Supp.
1985), have been consolidated into one exemption, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-27.L (Repl. Pamp.
1986), and the number of security holders which the issuer may have after the sale, has been reduced
from 25 to 10.
20. The new transactional exemption is added by N.M. STAT. ANN. §58-13B-27.K (Repl. Pamp.
1986), which permits the offer and sale of up to $1,500,000 of securities of a New Mexico corporation
or partnership without registration, while permitting advertising and general solicitation for investors
which is normally permitted only for the offer and sale of registered securities.
21. See generally N.M. STAT. ANN. §§58-13B-36 to 58-13B-53 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
22. Under the federal securities laws, the regulation of the registration of securities is focused
exclusively on disclosure of all material facts regarding the securities. The Securities and Exchange
Commission is without express authority to deny the registration of a security because of its "lack
of merit" as long as the disclosure requirements are satisfied. However, many state securities laws,
in addition to prescribing disclosure requirements in the registration process, also provide for merit
review. Merit review enables a state securities administrator to disallow the sale of the securities in
his state if he finds the offering not to be fair, just and equitable. The objections to merit review
focus on the vague standards by which such determination is or can be made.
23. Under the old New Mexico Securities Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-13-1 to 58-13-47 (Supp.
1985), the Director was required to affirmatively find that the sale of the security was fair, just and
equitable before approving the issue for sale in New Mexico. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-10 (Supp.
1985). The New Mexico Securities Act of 1986, while not completely eliminating merit review, has
specified the criteria by which such review, and the denial of registration, is made. N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 58-13B-25 (Repl. Pamp. 1986). This change not only limits the discretion of the Director,
but provides some specificity for the practitioner where little or none existed before.
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This change is not likely to have a significant impact on the process of
registering securities in New Mexico in that the now specified statutory
standards for merit review are the standards that were generally used by
the New Mexico Securities Division.
The goals and objectives sought to be achieved by the New Mexico
Securities Act of 1986 do not represent a significant change from prior
law. The goals are still a balance of the needs and interests of business
to raise capital against the interests of the state to protect New Mexico
investors. In this context, the new law appears to streamline and simplify
the process of registering securities for sale in New Mexico without
sacrificing consumer protection.
An analysis of the changes effected by the new law is beyond the scope
and intent of this Article, which focuses on case law developments under
the New Mexico and federal securities laws. This Article: (1) discusses
New Mexico decisions rendered during the primary survey period; (2)
addresses State v. Sheets,24 an important New Mexico case decided during
the secondary survey period; and (3) reviews Tenth Circuit decisions
separated into the primary and secondary survey periods.
11. THE NEW MEXICO SECURITIES CASES
A. Primary Survey Period Cases
1. Time-share Units as Securities
In State v. Gardner,25 the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction of the defendant for fraud in connection with the offer and
sale of time-share26 units. The defendant was charged with securities
fraud, failure to register securities, fraud over $2500, embezzlement,
solicitation, conspiracy, tampering with evidence, and attempted fraud.27
The defendant was convicted for the fraudulent sale or offer of securities,
conspiracy to commit fraud, criminal solicitation and criminal fraud over
$2500.28 The primary issues on appeal were procedural concerning the
lower court's denial of a motion for a mistrial and a motion to dismiss.'
The key securities issue, whether the time-share units were securities,
was not raised by the defendant nor addressed in the court's decision;
rather, the defendant and the court apparently accepted, without question,
the premise asserted by the state that the time-share units were securities.3"
24. 94 N.M. 356, 610 P.2d 760 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992 (1980).
25. 103 N.M. 320, 706 P.2d 862 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 103 N.M. 287, 705 P.2d 1138 (1985).
26. Time-share means a right to occupy a unit or any of several units during five or more separated
time periods over a period of at least five years, including renewal options, whether or not coupled
with a freehold estate or an estate for years in a time share project or a specified portion thereof,
including, but not limited to, a vacation license, prepaid hotel reservation, club membership, limited
partnership interest or vacation bond. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-11-2.1 (Supp. 1986).
27. Gardner, 103 N.M. at 321, 706 P.2d at 863.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 325-26, 706 P.2d at 867-68.
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A time-share unit does not, in and of itself, come within the definition
of a security.3 Thus, in order to be deemed a security, the time-share
unit "package" would have to constitute an investment contract.32 The
purchase of a time-share unit without it being coupled with services, such
as a rental management contract, involves only the purchase of an interest
in real property which should not constitute the purchase of a security.
A rental management contract should change the nature of the purchase
from merely an interest in real property to an "investment contract," i.e.,
a security.
Gardner does not disclose any facts that would cause the time-share
units that were sold to be considered "investment contracts." Had the
defendant raised the issue of whether the time-share units were securities,
he might have avoided conviction for violation of the New Mexico Se-
curities Act.33 Little comfort, perhaps, considering the defendant was
convicted on four other counts of fraud not related to the securities law."4
2. Sale of Unregistered Securities
State v. Shafer35 serves as a strong reminder that even an "innocent"
violation of the registration provisions of the New Mexico Securities Act36
can have severe consequences.37 In Shafer, the defendants offered and
31. A security was defined as ". . . any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence
of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation, certificate of interest in oil, gas or other
mineral rights, collateral trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable
shares, investment contract, voting-trust certificate or beneficial interest in title to property, profits
or earnings, or any other instrument commonly known as a security, including any guarantee of,
temporary or interim certificate of interest or participation in, or warrant or right to subscribe to,
convert into or purchase any of these .... " N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-2.H (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
The new law adds additional examples of what is a security and inserts a significant qualification
on the definition, to wit, "unless the context requires otherwise. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-
2.V (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
32. An investment contract can constitute a security if it involves "a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, 297, reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 819, 823 (1946).
33. Had the defendant raised this issue and prevailed, no conviction under the New Mexico
Securities Act would have been possible because no security would have been involved.
34. 103 N.M. at 321, 706 P.2d at 863.
35. 102 N.M. 629, 698 P.2d 902 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 102 N.M. 613, 698 P.2d 886 (1985).
36. The registration provisions of the Act, among other things, make it a felony for any person
to offer or sell any security in this state, except exempt securities or securities sold in exempt
transactions, unless the security is first registered under the Securities Act of New Mexico. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 58-13-4.A (Supp. 1985). The new law does not change this provision: "It is unlawful
for a person to offer to sell or sell any security in this state unless the security is registered under
the New Mexico Securities Act of 1986 . . . or the security or transaction is exempt under that act."
N.M. STAT. ANN. §58-13B-20 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
37. In addition to various administrative and civil remedies available to redress violations of the
registration requirements, the old law provided that any person who willfully violated the Securities
Act of New Mexico shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than three years, or both. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-43 (Repl. Pamp. 1984). But see infra note 48
and accompanying text. The New Mexico Securities Act of 1986 makes any willful violation of that
act a third degree felony and permits, upon conviction, a fine not to exceed $5,000 or imprisonment
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sold stock in their Texas corporation to twenty-three persons, seven of
whom were New Mexicans.3" In reliance upon advice of their Texas
counsel, the defendants believed they structured the offers and sales so
as to avoid the application of the New Mexico Securities Act either
because the law would not apply or because an exemption was available.39
The defendants argued unsuccessfully that notwithstanding the demon-
stration of the corporation's product in New Mexico, all of the transactions
involving sales of stock were set up so that investors' checks would be
sent to Texas and the stock would be issued in Texas, and thus the New
Mexico securities law should not apply; or, alternatively, that the stock
sales qualified for one or more exemptions from the registration require-
ments of New Mexico law.4
On appeal, the defendants argued that their convictions should be
overturned because: (1) they relied on the advice of counsel that the offers
and sales did not constitute a violation of New Mexico law; (2) the offers
and sales occurred in Texas and thus New Mexico law did not apply; and
(3) that the transactions qualified for either the isolated transactional
exemption4 or the small corporate offering exemption.42
The court soundly rejected all of defendants' arguments. First, the court
held that in New Mexico, good faith reliance on the advice of counsel
is not a defense to a charge of selling unregistered securities because
"scienter43 is not an element of the crime."'
Secondly, the court rejected the defendants' defense that they believed
not to exceed three years, or both, for each violation. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-39.A (Repl.
Pamp. 1986).
38. 102 N.M. at 634, 698 P.2d at 907.
39. Id. at 632, 698 P.2d at 905.
40. Id.
41. N.M. STAT. ANN. §58-13-30.A (Supp. 1982) provided an exemption from the registration
requirements for "any isolated transaction, whether effected through a broker-dealer or not." In
addition to the clarification of the meaning of "isolated" by the court in State v. Sheets, 94 N.M.
356, 610 P.2d 760 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992 (1980), (see infra, notes
44 and 72 and accompanying text), the New Mexico Securities Act of 1986 further modifies this
exemption by making it available only for non-issuer transactions. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-27.A
(Repi. Pamp. 1986).
42. The small corporate offering exemption exempts from registration the issuance and sale by
any corporation organized under the laws of New Mexico provided the number of security holders
does not, and will not, in consequence of the sale, exceed twenty-five, and the seller reasonably
believes all buyers are purchasing for investment and no commission or other remuneration is paid,
directly or indirectly, for soliciting any prospective buyer. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-30.J (Supp.
1982). The New Mexico Securities Act of 1986 modifies this exemption by reducing the number of
security holders from 25 to 10, but allows the payment of a commission for the sale of the securities
if paid to a broker-dealer or sales representative licensed pursuant to the act. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-
13B-27.L (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
43. The Supreme Court defined "scienter" in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, reh'g
denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976), as " .. . a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or
defraud. In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct
for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We need not address here the question whether, in
some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5." Id. at 194 n. 12.
44. 102 N.M. at 633, 698 P.2d at 906 (citing Sheets, 94 N.M. 356, 610 P.2d 760 and N.M.
STAT. ANN. §58-13-4 (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
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they had engaged in sales of securities only in Texas. 5 The court reasoned:
"Defendants' understanding or belief. . . went to their knowledge or
intent. Knowledge or intent is not an element of a charge of soliciting to
sell or selling unregistered securities .. . .All that is necessary is a willful
act of selling or offering to sell an unregistered security that is required
to be registered .
Finally, defendants' claim of exemption from registration was also
rejected by the court. With respect to their assertion of an isolated trans-
action exemption, the court held that an isolated transaction is one that
is "unique, occurring alone or once; sporadic, not likely to recur."47 In
light of the twenty-three stock sales, seven to New Mexicans, the court
found that those sales were not isolated.4" The small corporate offerings
exemption was not available because the defendants' corpoiation was
organized under the laws of Texas, and this exemption is available only
to New Mexico corporations.49
However, the defendants in Shafer enjoyed some success on appeal.
The lower court convicted them of third degree felonies based upon the
statutory language imposing penalties for violations of the New Mexico
Securities Act.5" The defendants were not able to convince the appellate
court that since no minimum term was specified by statute for violation
of the act, the minimum time should be construed to be one day. On the
other hand, the court did hold that since the statute did not specify that
a violation constituted a third degree felony, a violation of the statute was
a felony without degree and thus constituted a fourth degree felony.5'
B. Secondary Survey Period Case
1. Commercial Paper; Isolated Transaction Exemption
In State v. Sheets, 5 the defendant was convicted of seven counts of
selling unregistered securities." Defendant raised money from seven in-
dividuals, giving them a document entitled "Promissory Note." ' The
note did not state the amount of money furnished nor any rate of interest
to be paid. 55 The note merely stated the loan principal to be repaid and
45. Id. at 634, 698 P.2d at 907.
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Sheets, 94 N.M. at 365, 610 P.2d at 769).
48. Id. at 634, 698 P.2d at 907.
49. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 36.
51. Shafer, 102 N.M. at 637, 698 P.2d at 910. The New Mexico Securities Act of 1986 cures
this defect and specifically states that any person who willfully violates a provision of the Act is
guilty of a third degree felony. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-39.A (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
52. 94 N.M. 356, 610 P.2d 760 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992 (1980).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 359, 610 P.2d at 763.
55. Id.
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the timing of such payments. 6 On average, the difference between the
amount furnished and the "loan principal" to be repaid yielded an ap-
proximate 36% "interest" rate over the life of the note. 7 In his defense,
the defendant argued that none of the transactions came within the mean-
ing of security; that the notes were commercial paper exempt from reg-
istration; and/or that the notes were issued in isolated transactions and
thus exempt from registration. 8 The court rejected all of these arguments.
In claiming that the notes were not within the meaning of a security,
the defendant argued that for an instrument to be a security, there must
be an "investment" of the type that involves profit sharing or risk.59 The
defendant argued that, with one exception, there was not profit sharing
and that in all of the transactions the element of risk was missing because
there was an unconditional promise to pay.' ° The court rejected these
arguments, stating that they ignored the New Mexico Securities Act def-
inition of "security.- 61 Applying rules of statutory construction,62 the court
found no ambiguity in the terms "note" and "evidence of indebtedness. ,63
Thus, the court held the documents issued by the defendant were secu-
rities.
The defendant also unsuccessfully argued that the instruments in ques-
tion were "commercial notes"'  and, therefore, not securities within the
definition of the Act. The defendant argued that the "context" of the
transactions required non-security treatment of his commercial notes. In
rejecting this argument, the court pointed out that while the federal se-
curities laws defined "security" similar to New Mexico law, the distinction
that defendant asserted between commercial and investment notes exists
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 359-60, 610 P.2d at 763-64.
59. Id. at 360, 610 P.2d at 764.
60. Id.
61. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
62. The two primary rules of statutory construction followed by the court were: (I) in the absence
of ambiguity, statutes are to be given effect as written, State v. Elliott, 89 N.M. 756, 557 P.2d 1105(1977); and (2) statutory words are to be given their usual, ordinary meaning absent a clearly
expressed legislative intent requiring otherwise. Tafoya v. New Mexico State Police Board, 81 N.M.
710, 472 P.2d 973 (1970). Sheets, 94 N.M. at 360, 610 P.2d at 764.
63. Sheets, 94 N.M. at 360, 610 P.2d at 764.
64. Under federal law, a distinction has arisen between "investment notes," which are within the
purview of a security, and "commercial notes," which are not. To wit: ". . . not all notes are meant
to be reached by the federal securities law. Although this statement seems contrary to the clear
language 'any note,' the 'unless the context otherwise requires' language of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b and
78c(a) and the Supreme Court's indication that we are dealing with a flexible concept, S.E.C. v.
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), have been held to compel limitation concerning notes to be
considered within the definition. . . .Thus, not all notes are included within the protection of the
anti-fraud provisions." Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); see also Abrahams,
Commercial Notes and Definition of "Security" Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note is
a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. REV. 478 (1973).
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only under federal law.65 The federal definition of security includes the
phrase "unless the context otherwise requires," which phrase did not
appear in the New Mexico definition.' Because of this statutory differ-
ence, there was no support for the contention that "security" in the New
Mexico act excluded commercial notes.67
The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the promissory
notes were exempt from registration because they constituted "commer-
cial paper. "' While the court rejected the State's attempt to have the
term defined narrowly to follow the federal approach,69 it also rejected
the defendant's argument that "commercial paper" in the New Mexico
Securities Act must be given the same meaning as commercial paper
under the New Mexico Uniform Commercial Code.7° In holding the
commercial paper exemption was not applicable, the court found that
while the defendant's promissory notes were commercial paper, they were
not obligations to pay cash within nine months of the date of issuance.7'
The court held that the obligation to pay cash within nine months of the
date of issuance meant the obligation had to be paid in full, in cash,
65. Sheets, 94 N.M. at 362, 610 P.2d at 766.
66. Compare, 15 U.S.C.A. §77b (West 1981) with N.M. STAT. ANN. §58-13-2.H (1978) (the
statutory provision in effect at the time of the Sheets case). But see supra note 31 and infra note
67.
67. Under the New Mexico Securities Act of 1986, the "context" phrase has been added to the
definition of a "security." Thus, a distinction between commercial and investment notes may arise
in the future under this new definition, and commercial notes may fall outside the definition of a
"security." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-2.V (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
68. The defendant was attempting to rely upon the exempt securities provision of N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 58-13-29.H (Supp. 1985) which exempts from registration "any commercial paper which
arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of which have been, or are to be, used for current
transactions, and which evidences an obligation to pay cash within nine months of the date of
issuance .. "
The term "commercial paper" is "not defined in New Mexico's version of the Uniform Commercial
Code. See §§ 55-1-201 and 55-3-102, N.M.S.A. 1978. . . .Thus, 'commercial paper' is descriptive
of the kind of paper and not of the mode in which it was issued or used in a particular situation."
Sheets, 94 N.M. at 363, 610 P.2d at 767. The New Mexico Securities Act also does not define the
term "commercial paper." See also N.M. STAT. ANN. §58-13-29.H (Supp. 1985) and N.M. STAT.
ANN. §58-13B-26.I (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
69. The federal approach is to restrict the exempt security definition of "commercial paper" to
prime quality negotiable commercial paper of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general public
which is used to facilitate recognized types of current operational business requirements and which
is eligible for discounting by federal reserve banks. See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d
1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972), and Securities and Exchange Commission
Release 33-4412, 26 Fed. Reg. 9158 (1961).
70. While the court acknowledged that a document might be commercial paper under both acts,
it rejected the argument that commercial paper must have the same meaning under both acts in light
of the different purposes of the U.C.C. and the Securities Act. "Two purposes of the U.C.C. are
'(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions;' and '(b) to permit
the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties.'
Section 55-1-102, N.M.S.A. 1978. A purpose of our Securities Act, applicable in this case, is to
prevent the sale of unregistered securities." Sheets, 94 N.M. at 364, 610 P.2d at 768.
71. Id.
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within nine months of the date of issuance.72 Because none of the notes
issued by defendant were to be paid in full within nine months of issuance,
they were not commercial paper within the meaning of the New Mexico
Securities Act.73
The defendant's final argument was that since the note transactions
were "isolated," there was no public offering and thus registration was
not required. This argument was not only rejected by the court, but
criticized as well.74 Again, applying rules of statutory construction, the
court held that "isolated" means "unique; occurring alone or once; spo-
radic, not likely to recur." 75 Considering the dates involved76 and the
numerous repetitive issuance of promissory notes, none of the seven
counts involved an isolated transaction, and the isolated transaction
exemption did not apply.77
III. THE TENTH CIRCUIT CASES
A. Primary Survey Period Cases
1. Investment Contract Common Enterprise
In McGill v. American Land & Exploration Co., 8 the Tenth Circuit
addressed the common enterprise element of the Howey test for deter-
mining the existence of an investment contract79 and thus a security under
federal securities laws. The facts in McGill that gave rise to this issue
involved a joint venture to develop raw land for a residential subdivision.'
McGill invested in the joint venture with the defendant to develop lots
in a subdivision with the understanding that after certain improvements
were made the defendant would purchase all of the lots.' The land was
never developed and suit was filed.82
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss which the court treated as a
motion for summary judgment.8 3 The court then applied the Howey test
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 365, 610 P.2d at 769 (citing Besser Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 74 N.M. 377, 394 P.2d
141 (1964)).
76. The notes were sold at various times beginning in 1975 and ending in 1978. Sheets, 94 N.M.
at 365, 610 P.2d at 769.
77. Id.
78. 776 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1985).
79. An investment contract can constitute a security if it involves "a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party,..." S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 819 (1946).
80. 776 F.2d at 924.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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and held that the joint venture did not constitute a security because it did
not give rise to a "common enterprise" involving the plaintiff and de-
fendant.' 4
On appeal, the court observed that "[t]he district court was governed
entirely on the basis that no 'security' existed in this case upon the premise
that 'horizontal commonality'-that is, a pooling of funds received by a
promoter from multiple investors-is required before there can be a 'com-
mon enterprise' within the meaning of the Howey test." 85 The court
reversed the lower court because ". . . the rigid 'horizontal commonality'
requirement . . . has never been the law of [the Tenth Circuit]."86
When applying the Howey test, the Tenth Circuit looks to the "eco-
nomic reality"8" of the transaction to determine whether a "common
enterprise," and thus a "security," exists. 8 Following this approach, the
court concluded that the transaction satisfied the "common enterprise"
requirement of the Supreme Court's test and thus the joint venture interest
was a security."
2. Oil and Gas Interests; Control Person Liability
In San Franciso-Oklahoma Petroleum Exploration Corp. v. Carstan
Oil Co., 9° plaintiff brought a securities action seeking rescission of its
purchase of an undivided working interest in a producing oil well and
reimbursement. 9' The defendant corporation was organized to sell undi-
vided interests in oil properties.92 Advertisements were placed in news-
papers in several states offering the unregistered interests for sale.93 One
of the defendants was the sole shareholder, served as a director, and
provided the organizational funds. 94 His son was the active party in the
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 925.
87. Under the "economic reality" analysis, if "a transaction is purely commercial in nature (for
example, a commercial loan or a sale of assets), then it does not give rise to a 'common enterprise'
or a 'security.' If .... a transaction is in reality an investment ... then it creates a 'common
enterprise' and gives rise to a 'security' . . . . Id. at 925 (citing McGovern Plaza Joint Venture v.
First of Denver Mortgate Investors, 562 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1977)).
88. The Supreme Court has not decided whether "horizontal commonality" is required. See,
Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115 (1985). The Circuits are split on this issue with the Fifth,
Eighth and Ninth Circuits using a similar approach as the Tenth Circuit. See, e.g., Meyer v. Thomas
& McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1023 (1983); S.E.C. v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); cf. Booth
v. Peavey Co. Commodities Services, 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970). McGill, 776 F.2d at 925, n. 2
and n. 3.
89. McGill, 776 F.2d at 926.
90. 765 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1985).
91. Id. at 963.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 961.
94. Id. at 963.
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company and its manager.95 All the defendants, except for the sole share-
holder, had been discharged in bankruptcy. Thus, the sole shareholder
had to be held liable if the plaintiff was to collect on the judgment.
The district court entered summary judgment against the corporation
and its manager." The trial court decided that the sole shareholder was
a "controlling person," 97 but that he did not have sufficient knowledge
of the facts to be liable.9" The sole shareholder was the only defendant
involved in the appeal.9
The two issues on appeal were: (1) whether the undivided working
interest in a producing oil well was a "security" under the Securities Act
of 1933;"° and (2) whether the sole shareholder was a "controlling"
person under the act with the requisite knowledge to be held liable for
the violations of the corporate defendant. ' The Tenth Circuit agreed with
the trial court's determination that the shareholder was a controlling per-
son, and also found he had the requisite knowledge to be liable under
the Securities Act. 
02
The court found that the fact that the defendant attempted to demon-
strate a lack of knowledge by taking the position that he was nothing but
a figurehead simply established that he had not performed his duties as
a director.' 03 His testimony demonstrated that he must have made a con-
scious effort not to know. " The court pointed out that the defendant
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §77o (West 1981), provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who,
pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more
other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any
person liable under section I1, or 12, shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom
such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge
of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which
the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist. (Emphasis added.)
98. Carston, 765 F.2d at 963.
99. Id.
100. 15 U.S.C.A. §§77a to 77aa (West 1981). The Act defines a security as: "... any note,
stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation
in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into
on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any
of the foregoing. 15 U.S.C.A. §77b(l) (West 1986).
101. Carston, 765 F.2d at 963.
102. Id. at 964.
103. Id. at 965.
104. Id.
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knew the purpose for which the corporation was organized, participated
in its organization, and knew of the sales by mail. o5 His actual knowledge
of the transactions and how they were handled was significant. " Once
plaintiff had shown the defendant to be a controlling person, a prima
facie case had been established and the burden then shifted to the de-
fendant to demonstrate the lack of knowledge exception to liability. 07
The court held that the defendant failed to meet that burden. 08
The court then addressed the "security" issue. The parties agreed that
the transactions involved made use of interstate facilities; the interests
were not registered as securities; and the interests were within the express
provisions of the Act as a "fractional undivided interest in oil . . . rights"
or as an "investment contract.""0 The defendant argued that the clause,
"unless the context otherwise requires," required that the plain meaning
of the statute should not be applied because the transaction was between
knowledgeable, experienced parties in the oil business. "0 The court rec-
ognized the argument as being, in reality, a private offering exemption"'
argument and rejected it. Consequently, the court found the working
interests to be securities requiring registration under the Securities Act." 2
A second case in the primary survey period that addressed oil and gas
working interests and, tangentially, control person liability is Cowles v.
Dow Keith Oil & Gas, Inc."3 In this case, investors in working interests
in oil and gas leases brought an action against the issuer and the "control
person" under the federal and Oklahoma securities laws. "4 The key issues
were whether the interests were subject to registration' '5 and whether the
105. Id. at 964.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 965.
109. Id. See also supra note 100.
110. Carston, 765 F.2d at 965.
Ill. Id. An offer and sale of securities to a limited number of "sophisticated investors," that is,
investors who are knowledgeable and experienced in the type of investment being made, is but one
type of recognized private placement exemption from the registration requirements of the federal
securities laws. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. §77d(2) (West 1981).
112. Carston, 765 F.2d at 965.
113. 752 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 74 (1986).
114. Oklahoma has a "control person" provision similar to that under the federal securities laws
(see supra note 97 for the federal provision). OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, §408(b) (1983) provides:
Every person who materially participates or aids in a sale or purchase made
by any person liable under subsection (a), or who directly or indirectly controls
any person so liable, shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as the person so liable, unless the person who so participates, aids
or controls, sustains the burden of proof that he did not know, and could not
have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which liability is alleged
to exist....
115. Cowles, 752 F.2d at 511.
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omission of certain geological information was material and thus in viola-
tion of the anti-fraud provisions. "6
The pertinent consideration regarding the registration issue under the
Oklahoma securities law was whether the defendants had met their burden
to establish the availability of an exemption from registration. " 7 The lower
court found that they had, and the Tenth Circuit did not find that decision
to be clearly erroneous (the standard on review) and thus refused to reverse
the lower court. 1 ' The lower court also found that no public offering had
been involved and thus the registration requirements had not been trig-
gered. "' In reaching that conclusion the court found two facts critical:
first, the investors had contacted the issuer rather than the issuer contacting
the investors; and second, the investors "had about as much means of
acquiring information and knowledge as did the defendant."' 2 ° Those
facts, coupled with the long standing position of the Tenth Circuit that
"[in determining what constitutes a public offering, 'the general criterion
is whether the particular persons affected stand in need of the protection
of the Act,' ,,t2t led the court to conclude that the lower court's findings
were not clearly erroneous.' 22
The second issue on appeal was plaintiff's claim that defendants' failure
to provide geological or similar data to investors with respect to wells
drilled constituted the omission of a "material fact"'2 3 in violation of
Rule lOb-5.'24 Again, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the lower court's
finding that while such data might be "material" if defendants had been
116. Id. at 512.
117. The provision of the Oklahoma securities law at issue was OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 401(b)(15)
(1983).
118. Cowles, 752 F.2d at 511.
119. Id. at 512.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting G. Eugene England Found. v. First Fed. Corp., 663 F.2d 988, 990 (10th Cir.
1973), which was quoting Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116, 119 (10th Cir. 1963)).
122. Id.
123. The seminal case defining materiality is TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
449 (1976), in which the Supreme Court held "an omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important ......
124. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-5 (1986), states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
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a "big operator drilling deeper holes," such information was not material
in this case because defendants were conducting a minor operation and
plaintiff had as much means of acquiring information and knowledge as
the defendants.' 25 Since there was no finding of a primary violation by
the corporation, no liability could be imposed upon the individual de-
fendant as a control person. '26
B. Secondary Survey Period Cases'
1. Fraud on the Market
T. J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel
Authority,"as involved an interlocutory appeal challenging the lower court's
denial of the defendants' motion to decertify the underlying act as a class
action."' The importance of this case is that it is the case in which the
Tenth Circuit joined other circuits in adopting what is known as the "fraud
on the market" theory. 3 ' Traditionally, a private action for fraud under
the securities laws requires the plaintiff to establish actual reliance on the
defendant's deception.' 3' However, under a fraud on the market theory
of liability a plaintiff is allowed to rely on the integrity of the market
125. Cowles, 752 F.2d at 512. Whether a fact is material involves a mixed question of law and
fact, and only if the fact is "so obviously important to the investor, that reasonable minds cannot
differ on the question of materiality" is the issue appropriate for resolution as a matter of law. TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (citing Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422
F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970)). "The lower court's finding that failure to provide geological and
similar information was not the omission of a 'material fact' was not, therefore, clearly erroneous."
Cowles, 752 F.2d at 512.
126. This conclusion follows from the statutory language. See 15 U.S.C.A. §77o (West 1981),
supra note 97, and OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, §408(b), supra note 114.
127. Six cases in the secondary survey period are not discussed. These cases are Baum v. Great
W. Cities, Inc., 703 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1983) (only tangentially involving an anti-fraud allegation
under the Exchange Act); Wall Street West, Inc. v. S.E.C., 718 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1983) (affirming
that the Commission's administrative decisions will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of
discretion); S.E.C. v. Haswell, 654 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1981) (involving the denial of injunctive
relief because of the absence of scienteron the part of the defendant); S.E.C. v. Blackfoot Bituminous,
Inc., 622 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1980) (involving a subpoena enforcement action by the Commission);
Wertheim & Co. v. Codding Embryological Sciences, Inc., 620 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding
no § 10(b) liability for negligent misrepresentations); Cronin v. Midwestern Oklahoma Dev. Auth.,
619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980) (involving an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in which
the securities issues were not developed).
128. 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984).
129. Id. at 1331.
130. The Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have adopted the fraud on the market theory. See,
e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981)(en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983); and Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). The Eighth Circuit has not adopted the fraud on the
market theory. See, Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1978). While there
appears to be, at present, a trend towards restricting rather than broadening the scope of fraud actions
under the federal securities laws, the fraud on the market theory is one of the few exceptions to this
apparent present trend.
131. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1332.
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rather than requiring direct reliance on the defendant's conduct. '3 2 Thus,
subjective reliance on particular misrepresentations is not an element of
proof of fraud claims under this theory. '33 "The theory is grounded on
the assumption that the market price reflects all known material infor-
mation. . . .At its simplest, the theory requires only that a plaintiff prove
purchase of a security and that a material' 34 misrepresentation was made
concerning the security by the defendant which resulted in an artificial
change in price."' 3
2. Oklahoma Take-Over Act
Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Service Co., '36 involved four consolidated
appeals by the Administrator of the Oklahoma Department of Securities
challenging the lower court's injunction against enforcement of the Okla-
homa Take-Over Bid Act (Take-Over Act). ,3 The Take-Over Act applied
to any tender offer'38 in which the target company'39 is organized under
Oklahoma law or has substantial assets and its principal place of business
in Oklahoma, or has substantial assets and significant operations in Okla-
homa or has shareholders in Oklahoma who own, beneficially or of record,
an aggregate of ten percent of any class of equity securities subject to
the take-over bid. 140
Under the Take-Over Act the Administrator is given significant power
to pass upon the adequacy of the disclosure made in connection with any
tender offer for shares of qualifying target companies. The breadth of
power so granted enables the Administrator to prohibit or at least delay
the consummation of any such tender offer. "' Following the reasoning
of the Supreme Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 42 the Tenth Circuit held
that the Oklahoma Take-Over Bid Act violated the commerce clause of
the United States Constitution as an unreasonable restraint on interstate
tender offers for corporate securities and upheld the lower court's prelim-
inary and permanent injunctions.'
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 123 for a definition of "material."
135. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1332.
136. 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983).
137. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, §§431 to 450 (1981) (Repealed 1985).
138. A tender offer has yet to be formally defined by Congress, the courts or the Commission.
Generally, however, a tender offer involves the attempt to acquire a significant portion of a company's
stock (usually somewhere between a controlling interest to all of the stock). A tender offer need not
be a public offering.
139. The target company is the company whose shares are sought to be acquired.
140. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, §433(4)(a)-(d) (1981) (Repealed 1985).
141. Id. at §437.
142. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
143. Mesa, 715 F2d at 1433.
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3. Sale of Business
In Christy v. Cambron,'" the court held that plaintiff's sale of shares
in a corporation, which was formed to operate a discotheque, to investors
who participated in the operations of the corporation were not securities
within the meaning of the federal securities laws.'45 The court's decision
was based on the "sale of business" doctrine, which states that an essential
attribute of a security is that it represents an investment in a venture which
derives profits from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.'4 6
Since the plaintiffs were actively involved in operating and managing the
discotheque, the shares of stock were not incidents of an investment which
derived profits from the efforts of others. 47
4. Justifiable Reliance
In Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., ' 41 plaintiff purchased securities in reliance
upon oral misrepresentations by the defendants that the investments in-
volved no risk, were a "sure thing" and "couldn't miss.' ' 149 Notwith-
standing those oral statements, the private placement memorandum contained
warnings which contradicted those statements. ' ° The issue before the
Tenth Circuit was, as a matter of law, whether plaintiff's reliance on
defendants' oral misrepresentations could be "justifiable"'' in light of
144. 710 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1983).
145. Id. at 672.
146. Id.
147. Id. The precedential value of this case is questionable in light of the recent Supreme Court
decisions in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (reversing the Ninth Circuit
and holding that the sale of all of the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws), and Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985)
(upholding the Third Circuit's decision that the sale of 50% of the stock of a company is a securities
transaction subject to the anti-fraud provisions).
148. 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983).
149. Id. at 1514.
150. Id.
151. An element of proof in a misrepresentation case under Rule lOb-5 requires the plaintiff to
establish that, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, the defendant, with scienter,
made a false representation of a material fact upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied to his or her
detriment. Id. at 1516 (citing Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976) (en banc),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977)).
While no single factor is determinative, the following factors have been viewed as relevant by
various courts in determining whether reliance was justifiable: "(1) the sophistication and expertise
of the plaintiff in financial and securities matters; (2) the existence of a long standing business or
personal relationship; (3) access to the relevant information; (4) the existence of a fiduciary rela-
tionship; (5) concealment of the fraud; (6) the opportunity to detect the fraud; (7) whether the plaintiff
initiated the stock transaction or sought to expedite the transaction; and (8) the generality or specificity
of the misrepresentations. See G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 955 (5th Cir.
1981); Nye v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1197 (8th Cir. 1978); Straub v. Vaisman
& Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976); Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156, 176-
77 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 .... (1976)." Zobrist, 708 F.2d at 1516.
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the warnings contained in the private placement memorandum, 52 but
which the plaintiff failed to read.'
Despite the risk that boilerplate language of a prospectus could become
a shield behind which promoters could safely hide while boldly making
fraudulent misstatements, 54 the court expressed its view that knowledge
of information contained in a prospectus or an equivalent document au-
thorized by statute or regulation, should be imputed to investors who fail
to read such documents. '55 The court thus held that the plaintiff must be
charged with constructive knowledge of the risks and warnings contained
in the private placement memorandum. '56 With knowlege of the disclosed
risks being imputed to the plaintiff, it was evident that he acted recklessly
by intentionally closing his eyes to and failing to investigate contradictions
between the misrepresentations and the information in the memoran-
dum. 5
7
In a strong dissenting opinion,' 58 Judge Holloway found the court's
decision in Zobrist irreconcilable with the court's previous decision in
Holdsworth v. Strong. '9 In Holdsworth, the court held that the plaintiff's
conduct in Rule lOb-5 cases bars recovery only when it "rises to a level
of culpable conduct comparable to that of the defendant . . . . " The
Holdsworth opinion concluded that if the plaintiff was required to prove
both the defendant's scienter and his own due diligence, the remedy would
be undesirably restricted.' 6 ' Judge Holloway acknowledged that the ma-
jority was understandably concerned about aiding a plaintiff who failed
to read material furnished him concerning the investment. 6 However,
the policy of prevention of fraud was the core of the securities laws and
should not have been overlooked simply because other conflicting policies
were also implicated.' 63 In his opinion, the policy of deterring intentional
misconduct outweighed that of negligent or reckless conduct. "6
152. The memorandum contained all of the "standard" risk and suitability disclosures, including
the usual disclaimer that: "No person has been authorized to give any information or to make any
representations not contained in this Memorandum . . .and, if given or made, such information or
representations must not be relied upon." Id. at 1517-18.
153. id. at 1515.
154. Id. at 1516.
155. Id. at 1518.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1518-19.
158. Id. at 1520.
159. 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
160. Id. at 693.
161. 708 F.2d at 1521.
162. Id. at 1522.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1019 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977)).
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5. Exempt Securities not Exempt from Anti-Fraud Provisions
In United States v. Roylance, '65 the Tenth Circuit upheld a district court
determination that the defendant committed securities fraud even though
he contended that the promissory notes he sold were not subject to the
anti-fraud regulations of the Securities Act of 1933.'" The defendant
solicited investment funds from individuals to finance a gold ore refine-
ment scheme. '67 The thrust of defendant's argument on appeal was that
the notes were not subject to the anti-fraud regulations because they had
maturity periods less than nine months, and thus were exempted from
the requirements of the Securities Act.' 68 Since an exemption from reg-
istration (either because the security is exempt or the transaction is ex-
empt) does not afford an exemption from the anti-fraud provisions of the
Securities Act, the Tenth Circuit had no difficulty in holding that the
maturity date exemption was inapplicable to securities fraud prosecu-
tions. "' Moreover, the maturity exemption has traditionally been limited
to prime quality commercial paper and generally does not extend to notesissued for investment security purposes. 70
6. Intrastate Telephone Calls Yield Federal Jurisdiction
Loveridge v. Dreagoux,'7' serves as a reminder that the jurisdictional
reach of the federal securities laws is broad. The defendants in this case,
among other things, raised funds from the plaintiffs through the sale of
debentures.' 72 The initial contact with the plaintiffs was made via an
intrastate telephone call. 173 The particular facts regarding the fraudulent
conduct are not important for the purpose for which this case is discussed.
Defendants argued that the use of the telephone to make intrastate calls
did not satisfy the interstate commerce requirement of Section 10(b)' 74
165. 690 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1982).
166. Id. at 168-69.
167. Id. at 165.
168. The defendant was attempting to rely upon the exempt security provision of § 3(a)(3) of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §77c(a)(3) (West 1981), which exempts from registration:
Any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which arises out of
a current transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for
current transactions, and which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not
exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the
maturity of which is likewise limited.
169. Roylance, 690 F.2d at 168-69.
170. See supra note 69.
171. 678 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1982).
172. Id. at 872-73.
173. Id. at 873.
174. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §78j(b) (West 1981), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
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of the Exchange Act and Rule I Ob-5 75 promulgated thereunder. The court
readily dismissed defendants' argument and held that intrastate telephone
calls are sufficient to confer jurisdiction in this action.' 76 This is not a
new position of the federal courts regarding the reach of federal juris-
diction. 17
7. Recklessness Equals Scienter
Similar to Loveridge, the importance of Hackbart v. Holmes, 171 lies
not in its factual situation. Rather, the importance of Hackbart is that in
this case the Tenth Circuit expressly joined the majority of the circuits'79
in concluding that reckless behavior satisfies the scienter requirement of
a Rule lOb-5 case. 8° The circuits so holding expand upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder'' that liability under
Rule lOb-5 requires a finding of scienter. In Hochfelder, the Supreme
Court declined to decide whether reckless behavior is sufficient to estab-
lish liability, but concluded that negligence is not sufficient.
8. Statute of Limitations for Fraud
In State of Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross,'82 the Tenth
Circuit held that in securities fraud cases only the limitations period is
borrowed from state law. '83 The tolling period is supplied by federal law'84
in accordance with the principles announced in Holmberg v. Armbrecht. 85
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
175. See supra note 124.
176. Loveridge, 678 F.2d at 874.
177. See, e.g., Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974) (federal securities laws
jurisdiction on the basis of an intrastate telephone message); see also Weiss v. United States, 308
U.S. 321 (1939) and NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
178. 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982).
179. Every circuit that has addressed the issue of whether recklessness satisfies the scienter
requirement has held that it does. See G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945 (5th Cir.
1981); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3rd Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben,
598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted and vacated sub nom., S.E.C. v. Board of Trade of
Chicago, 454, U.S. 1026 (1982); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 970 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1039 (1978); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 875 (1977).
180. Prior to Hackbart, the Tenth Circuit had, at least implicitly, concluded that recklessness was
sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement. See Wertheim & Co. v. Codding Embryological Sci-
ences, Inc., 620 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1980); Cronin v. Midwester Okla. Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856
(10th Cir. 1980); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. S.E.C., 591 F.2d 588 (10th Cit. 1979).
181. 425 U.S. 185, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
182. 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
183. Id. at 691.
184. Id.
185. 327 U.S. 392 (1946). The essence of the Holmberg principle is that the borrowed statute
of limitations period does not begin to run "until after [plaintiff] had discovered, or had failed in
reasonable diligence to discover, the alleged deception. Peterson, 651 F.2d 692 (citing Holm-
berg, 327 U.S. at 397).
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Thus, federal equitable tolling applies to private actions under § 10(b),, 86
and the statute does not begin to run until after the plaintiff discovers,
or fails in reasonable diligence to discover, the alleged fraud. '87 The facts
developed showed that Ohio knew or had reason to know that Peterson
et al., the law firm that assisted the company that had fraudulently sold
securities which Ohio had purchased,' may have participated in the
company's fraud as much as four years prior to the time Ohio sought to
amend its complaint and name Peterson as a defendant in its fraud ac-
tion.'89 Therefore, the lower court's decision to disallow Ohio to amend
its complaint to name Peterson as a defendant was affirmed."9
9. Standard of Proof Under Investment Company Act; Aiding and
Abetting Under the Investment Advisers Act
In Decker v. S.E.C., 1'' an investment adviser petitioned for review of
an order of the Commission censuring him for aiding and abetting a
violation of Section 17(1) of the Investment Company Act'9 2 of 1940'
and imposing sanctions pursuant to Section 203(5) 94 of the Investment
186. 15 U.S.C.A. §78j(b) (West 1981).
187. Peterson, 651 F.2d at 692.
188. Id. at 689-91.
189. Id. at 695.
190. Id.
191. 631 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1980).
192. 15 U.S.C.A. §80a-17(e)(I) (West 1981) states:
(e) It shall be unlawful for any affiliated person of a registered investment
company, or any affiliated person of such person-
(i) acting as agent, to accept from any source any compensation (other than
a regular salary or wages from such registered company) for the purchase or
sale of any property to or for such registered company or any controlled com-
pany thereof, except in the course of such person's business as an underwriter
or broker;
193. Id. at § 80a-1-80a-64. The Investment Company Act [hereinafter ICA] is intended to provide
a comprehensive regulatory scheme to correct and prevent certain abusive practices (such as self-
dealing) in management of investment companies for protection of persons who put up money to
be invested by such companies on their behalf. See, e.g., Gen. Time Corp. v. Am. Investors Fund,
Inc., 283 F. Supp. 400 (D.C.N.Y), affirmed, 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026
(1969); see also 15 U.S.C.A. §80a-I (West 1981).
194. 15 U.S.C.A. §80b-3(e)(5) (West 1981) provides:
(e) The Commission, by order, shall censure, place limitations on the activities,
functions, or operations of, suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months,
or revoke the registration of any investment adviser if it finds, on the record
after notice and opportunity for hearing, that such censure, placing of limita-
tions, suspension, or revocation is in the public interest and that such investment
adviser, or any person associated with such investment adviser, whether prior
to or subsequent to becoming so associated-
(5) has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured
the violation by any other person of any provisions of the Securities Act of
1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, subchapter I of this chapter, this
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Advisers Act.' 95 The facts at issue in this case are as follows. Petitioner
became affiliated with a registered investment adviser in 1972 which was
the adviser to a registered investment company for which petitioner served
as portfolio manager."9 In his capacity as portfolio manager he selected
the brokers who would handle the purchase and sale of securities on
behalf of the investment company. 19 7 One of the brokers so selected,
through a wholly owned subsidiary, entered into a contract with a sub-
sidiary of the investment adviser to provide research and investment
services. ,'
During the two-year period that this contract was in effect, the in-
vestment adviser significantly increased the amount of brokerage business
it gave to the broker generally. 9 The Commission took the position that
the payments made under the research and investment service contract
were intended partially to compensate the investment adviser for the
brokerage business it gave to the broker. 2' The Commission found pe-
titioner had violated or aided and abetted violations of Section 17(e)(1)
of the ICA and Section 203(5) of the IAA.2°'
The court addressed the issues of: (1) the standard of proof required
for violations of Section 17(1);202 and (2) the state of mind required to
impose a sanction under Section 203(5)203 of the IAA. 21 Section 17(1)
prohibits the receipt of compensation in exchange for the purchase or
sale of property to or for an investment company. The Commission ap-
pears, in finding petitioner in violation of that section, to have interpreted
this prohibition to mean that it would be violated whenever an investment
adviser finds himself in a conflict of interest situation with respect to the
allocation of brokerage business. 205 The court did not agree with the
Commission's expansive reading of that section and held that for the
section to be violated there must be some nexus shown between the
compensation received and the property bought or sold.2'
subchapter, the rules or regulations under any of such statutes, or the rules of
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, or has failed reasonably to super-
vise, with a view to preventing violations of the provisions of such statutes,
rules, and regulations, another person who commits such a violation, if such
other person is subject to his supervision. ...
195. Decker, 631 F.2d at 1382-83. The Investment Advisers Act is hereinafter cited as IAA.
196. Id. at 1382.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1383.
202. Id.
203. 15 U.S.C.A. §80b-3(e)(5) (West 1981).
204. Decker, 631 F.2d at 1386.
205. Id. at 1384.
206. Id.
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The petitioner argued that the Commission, in finding a violation, had
erroneously failed to apply a "clear and convincing" standard of proof
in finding that he violated the law.27 In addressing the standard of proof
to be applied, the court noted that in civil cases the standard is a "pre-
ponderance of the evidence," 2"8 in criminal cases the standard is "beyond
a reasonable doubt,"2 but in some cases, particularly those involving
allegations of fraud or other quasi-criminal wrongdoing, courts have adopted
an intermediate standard of "clear and convincing. 2 0 The court inter-
preted the Addington2 ' decision as establishing a balancing approach,
weighing the interests of the individual against the interests of society,
to determine whether the standard to be applied should be a "prepon-
derance" or "clear and convincing. 2 2 Applying this balancing approach,
the court concluded that the proper standard in this case was a prepon-
derance of the evidence.213 The court remanded the question of the Section
17(e)(1) violation to the Commission for further consideration of the
record in light of its interpretation of that section that the mere existence
of a conflict of interest is not automatically a violation of the law.2"4
Regarding the state of mind issue, the court held that before a sanction
can be imposed under Section 203(5) of the ICA the Commission must
find that the underlying violation occurred through willful action. 2'5 The
court noted that the term "willfully" has been held in similar contexts to
mean merely "intentionally committing" the act which constitutes the
violation, but there is no requirement that the violator be aware that he
is violating one of the Rules or Acts.216 However, in the context of an
aiding and abetting violation, the court held that more must be shown to
establish the state of mind necessary for aiding and abetting. 217
Relying upon a prior decision of the District of Columbia Circuit,2 8
the court held that aiding and abetting liability under Section 17(e)(1)
requires proof of three elements: (1) another party has committed a se-
curities law violation; (2) the accused aider and abettor had a general
awareness that his role was part of an overall activity that was improper;
and (3) the accused aider and abettor knowingly and substantially assisted
207. Id. at 1383.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1383-84 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)).
211. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
212. Decker, 631 F.2d at 1384.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1386.
215. Id.
216. Id. (citing Tager v. S.E.C., 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1985)).
217. Decker, 631 F.2d at 1386-87.
218. Investors Research Corp. v. S.E.C., 628 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919
(1980).
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the principal violations.2"9 The court remanded on the issue of the peti-
tioner's state of mind at the time of the alleged improper conduct.22
10. Raw Land as a Security
In Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 221 the Tenth Circuit reversed
a district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' action for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.2 2 Essentially, plaintiffs were alleging
the existence of an investment contract for purposes of bringing an action
under the federal securities laws.223 The plaintiffs alleged they had pur-
chased lots with investment intent; that the vendors encouraged investment
purchases by promising that the lots would increase in value because of
the vendors' activities in developing and providing amenities; and that
the vendors led the plaintiffs to believe that a trust would be established
to construct and operate the facilities for their common benefit. 224 The
court recognized that the fact that the plaintiffs did not expect to realize
any tangible gain until their lots were sold did not preclude investment
intent. 25 "Profits" as used in the investment contract definition could be
"capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial in-
vestment. "226 Further, a common enterprise did not require the sale of
undivided interests or an entirely separable and express management
contract.227 The court did not decide whether plaintiffs indeed purchased
a security.228 It only held that plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to
prevent determination of the issue on a Rule 12(b) motion. 29
11. Standing Under § 10(b) for Private Injunction
In Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Bader & Dufty,23 ° the Tenth Circuit
was asked to determine if the rule of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores23 applied to a private action under rule lOb-5 seeking only in-junctive relief.23 2 Defendants were financing a suit against Westinghouse
219. Decker, 631 F.2d at 1388.
220. Id.
221. 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980).
222. Id. at 1044.
223. Id. at 1038.
224. Id. at 1039.
225. Id.
226. Id. The court drew a distinction between capital appreciation through development and ageneral increase in land value concurrent with neighborhood growth and improvement. Id., n. I.
227. Id. at 1039.
228. Id. at 1038.
229. Id.
230. 627 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1980).
231. 421 U.S. 723, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975). This case held that in order to have
standing to sue under § 10(b) one had to be either a purchaser or a seller of the security involved.
232. Westinghouse, 627 F.2d at 223.
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through the sale of profit-sharing agreements.233 Westinghouse sought to
enjoin further sales as a means to terminate the litigation.
2 34
The court did not decide the issue under Blue Chip Stamps because,
in its view, Westinghouse did not have standing under the court's decision
in Vincent v. Moench.235 Vincent involved a scheme to defraud plaintiffs.
236
In furtherance of that scheme the defendants deceptively purchased se-
curities from a third party, and, though not in privy or a party, the plaintiffs
nonetheless suffered injury.2 37 The court held, however, that such did not
spell federal jurisdiction where there was no direct, or causal, connection
between the deceptive purchase of a security and the alleged injury to
the plaintiffs.238
Applying the rationale of Vincent to Westinghouse, the court held that
there was no direct connection between the sale by defendants of profit-
sharing agreements and the alleged injury to Westinghouse, i.e., the
continued prosecution of a lawsuit against Westinghouse.2
39 Absent this
connection, the court held that Westinghouse had no standing to pursue
a private action under Section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5, even though it was
for injunctive relief only.2"
CONCLUSION
The cases decided in both the primary and secondary survey periods
do not present any dramatic departures from existing interpretations of
the issue decided, nor do they present any dramatic new inroads in inter-
pretation or application. Probably the most important point to note about
the cases, especially those decided in New Mexico courts, is the impor-
tance of informing and educating the court to the nuances of the securities
laws. Until the New Mexico courts have the opportunity to deal with
securities law issues on a more frequent basis, the importance of the
attorney's responsibility in educating and informing the courts cannot be
overemphasized.
233. Id. at 222.
234. Id.
235. 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973).
236. Westinghouse, 627 F.2d at 223.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 224.
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